



The situational state in perspective of jurisdictional-territorial governance of Manabí

El estado situacional en perspectiva de Gobernanza jurisdiccional-territorial de Manabí

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ABSTRACT

This paper addresses governance in a territorialized manner in the province of Manabí in the republican path of Ecuador, which since 1830 to the territory made it political jurisdiction that has governed the institutional state with powers for local government levels, in: provinces, cantons and parishes, it is in these spaces where it has been printed programmatic senses that have provided common goods, more in the population, than in the territorial, central point of

the tracing carried out in the present work through the documentary review as a research method, which approaches each level of government, which determines whether this local governance has taken effect and put it in value, in terms of: population and territorial cohesion provincially in Manabi.

RESUMEN

El presente trabajo aborda la gobernanza de manera territorializada en la provincia de Manabí en el trayecto republicano del Ecuador, que desde 1830 al territorio lo hizo jurisdicción política que ha regido el Estado institucional con competencias para niveles de gobierno local, en: provincias, cantones y parroquias, es en estos espacios donde se ha impreso sentidos programáticos que han dotado de bienes comunes, más en lo poblacional, que en lo territorial, punto central del rastreo realizado en el presente trabajo mediante la revisión documental como método de investigación, la que acerca a cada nivel de gobierno, que determine si está gobernanza local ha surtido efecto y ponerla en valor, en cuanto a: cohesión poblacional y territorial provincialmente en Manabí.

Keywords / Palabras clave

Governance, local management, participation, local-territorial planning.

Gobernanza, gestión local, participación, planificación local-territorial.

Introduction

Governance is a neologism adopted by political science adapted to various scenarios, from the macro planetary and regional, as in the meso national, to the micro at the local level, discursive narrative that is not alien to Ecuador, because this is a State under permanent construction, hegemonic in its monoterritorial centralism, although it is declared by Constitution (Art. 1. 2008) to be governed in a decentralized manner through autonomous governments (GADs) for the jurisdictions: provinces, cantons and parishes; just with the permanent constitutional reforms since 1830, it has not found the

institutional formula to govern the local efficiently and democratically, because with the instances so far tested are still weak in territorial impact, restrictively limited to regulatory frameworks, lacking citizen mandates, only legitimized by universal suffrage without programmatic subjection.

In spite of the above, with the institutional devices called GADs, statehood gained importance in the internal political jurisdictions, forming the set of administrative divisions, with their limits, territories or cells projected on the map, drawing the image of a network with its threads and meshes (Gondard, 2005: 45); this jurisdictional status to the territory it covers has given it political representativeness with a sense of statehood.

70 But these GADs, their action, more than political, is administrative, making it insufficient to better manage the State despite their population-territorial proximity, which continues to dispute the participation/dependence assistance from the national treasury that satisfies its deficit and essential basic goods, at . Although the local through the institutional Spanish colonial Cabildo has been present throughout the republic, it is the recent legal level of government since 1966, effective functional instance for local control in the unitary republic and dependent on the state centralism that has lasted until now.

This sectional regime, present in the 20 Constitutions of the unstable Ecuador until 2008, granted "autonomy" since 1946 and specific laws for each level, without achieving the configuration of a multilevel governance with territorial relevance, promoting multiple interventions interfering and contributing to the dispersion and fragmentation of state management, pretending to organize it institutionally through the Organic Code of Decentralized Autonomous Territorial Planning (COOTAD, 2010), assuming to harmonize the management in and between local government levels up to the national level.

From these GADs, governmental management is carried out, subject to the discretion of whoever is elected to direct it, sustaining deficient basic goods and services, levels of development without territorially organized spatialities; persisting in this form and levels of government contrary to the demands even with pandemic risks such as COVID 19 that paralyzed human activities, manipulating the

reality that substantially affects the life of the population and territories.

Basic goods and services, being essential, show socio-territorial backwardness with local political action that differentiates it from the national one, the latter being more complex and abstract; the local one is direct, concrete and pragmatic, an advantage that distances it from the dispute of interests of the national one; here is where the local must be more assertive in its competences with capacities of population-territorial responses, taking advantage of the strengthening of decentralization in relation to the national government, weak in the incidence of its local economy; the latter requires key improvements that effectively create "a system of action on its territory, capable of producing common values and locally managed goods" (Arocena, 1995: 9).

- 71 The installed Local Governance is governed by the current political-constitutional-normative-institutional framework, lacks citizenship that promotes management with a strategic sense subject to a long-term political project that contributes to territorial management, overcoming practices of subordination or institutional-territorial colonization. Here the normative is not only a legal instrument, but a basic input that achieves harmony between the various levels of GADs, and with their local societies.

In Manabí, a Provincial Government, 22 Municipalities and 55 Parishes share unequal and dispersed governmental responsibilities, disjointed among the multilevel and with the decentralized executive, objective conditions that sustain the central incidence of the national government, hindering an integral management of the provincial, cantonal and parochial territory in a harmonious manner.

The aforementioned keeps pending essential solutions that have installed resistance to change and rejection to politics, but more to politicians, because governmental-state action has had no effect on the common good, attacking them permanently, without leaving the comfortable privatized decision-action to socializing spaces that democratize the socio-territorial.

Ecuador and Manabí have not finished structuring themselves; to do so, they must recognize themselves internally from their diversity and jurisdictional differences, which is where their limit or potential lies; a structural situation that has not yet been strongly corrected, sustaining the uniform and monoterritorial centralist hegemony,

making necessary an adequate and agreed territorial governance that substantially modifies the fragmentations and weak dispersions that respond to the interests of the population through desired models of jurisdictions and local governance as an integrating source.

Materials and Methods

The present work constitutes a research challenge for and at the local level in Ecuador, which is subject to competencies and supposed public policies without configuring an institutional architecture governed by means of a pertinent socio-territorial governance. The work analyzes the state installed from its approaches and practices implemented through documentary review as a research method, it approaches each level of government: provincial, cantonal and parish, 72 identifying its limits and potential, subordinations or positions that hinder or make viable the socio-territorial management. In the contextual approaches, differentiated practices, lines, political and/or programmatic pragmatics of each level of government are identified, identifying schemes of interest and intentions of the ruler in office.

The documentary references are generally based on the current development and land use plans, specifically the provincial one, determining whether the state of affairs has been altered by or with the formulation and implementation of programs with a socio-territorial scope. The conclusion highlights the factual probability of implementing a governance model as a key factor for the organization of democratic territorial management that facilitates the construction of organized spatialities, rather than political jurisdictions in Manabí.

Results

The jurisdictional evolution of Manabí.

The republican Ecuador of 1830 was formed through the pact between four colonial localities: Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca and Loja, each of these gestated their independence, a conditioning factor that has interfered to consolidate the national state, surviving a central state hegemony superimposed on the local; a constant that is

reinforced in the 70s of the twentieth century. This constant was reinforced in the 70's of the XXth century, which entered prematurely to the de-statization since 1980 influenced by the planetary neoliberalism deteriorating the statehood, trying to re-statize since 2007, without having achieved it, because the State as a national project is still in dispute between the national-local centralism-polycentrism reproducing and/or sustaining inequalities that hinder making regions, provinces or localities as constitutive parts of the national project; in spite of that, the political leadership and dominant elite have mutually benefited each other, leaving out the substratum of the people, eroding the lasting state-government legitimacy.

- 73 It is Manguashca (1996: 185-223), who makes an analysis of the gravitation or relationship between the State and the regional powers given in three cycles: from 1830 to 1925, where Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca become the epicenter of territorial identities, meaning a setback in terms of consolidation of national unity. The other from 1925 to 1972, characterized by the presence of centripetal social forces that made the consolidation of a strong national state impossible; and the last one with neoliberalism since the 1980s, which lost all state perspective delivered to the market with which autonomist pretensions arose; a fourth cycle of state re-centralization would be added between 2007-2017.

Manguashca (1994: 357-358) analyzes the role of central power in the process of national integration since the republican conformation, proposing as a hypothesis the centrality of the State as a bureaucratic institution as the main engine of national integration. Using the dimensions proposed by Tarrow regarding the process of national formation in Western Europe and the impact that central governments have had on the peripheries, based on three indicators: a- political-administrative penetration referring to the creation of institutions to achieve military and administrative control; b- normative homogenization consisting of the creation of laws and; c- the social incorporation of marginal groups.

It is with the normative homogenization where the State as jurisdiction is not at all synonymous with territory, only a jurisdictional delimitation in which the political domain rules through the GADs spread throughout the national territory, reaching the socio-territorial daily life, making them necessary, arrogating functions through public works and services; here the territory

became jurisdiction, homogenizing space, dissolving differences, unifying diversity and simplifying reality (Pérez, 2016: 10), without achieving the configured jurisdictional organization or democratization, but rather the imposed state and national-local elite dominance.

Manabí, in the national context of Ecuador, is unique, jurisdictionally recognized in 1824 (Núñez, 2000: 27), conformed/fragmented in 22 cantons and 55 rural parishes in its 18,949 km², making it vulnerable to cohesion and organized integration with/by a territorially provincialized governance. The cantonalist fragmentation is a direct heir of the Spanish colonial Cabildo of local control and dominion and urban centers, head of the republic, even with legislative autonomy (Ordinances) that immediately solved daily issues without requiring real decision. Useful in the colony, independence and republic as an effective mechanism of representation of the local Creole elites 74 (Reig, 1985: 13-19) still in force today.

Cantonalism as a juridical-political determinant in and for Manabí has occurred in four stages:

Before the republic: Portoviejo 1820, Montecristi 1822 and Jipijapa 1824;

With the republic: Rocafuerte 1852, Sucre 1875, Santa Ana 1884 and Chone 1894;

In the consolidation of state modernization: Bolívar 1913, Manta 1922, Paján 1945, Junín 1952, 24 de mayo 1952 and El Carmen 1967,

With the return to democracy in 1979: Tosagua 1984, Pichincha 1986, Flavio Alfaro 1988, Pedernales 1992, Puerto López 1994, Olmedo 1995, Jama 1998, Jaramijó 1998, and San Vicente 1999.

This provincial structuring initiated in the historical-colonial seat, expanded with the republic from the capital of Portoviejo, extending the statehood and capital; the last fragmentation occurred in the northern province was gestated by/with the historical disconnection, creating 7 of the 10 cantons since 1979, without having met the assumptions of improvement in solving backwardness and socio-territorial poverty, such as municipal strengthening that makes complex governance between cantonal and/or parish pairs, as between the multilevel province-canton-parish.

This fragmentation for Ecuador is a constant, due to the fact that the senses of coexistence, belonging and pertinence have had a practice of confinement and reductionism, being this practice of construction of space conflictive, prioritizing local interests, and not the product of cohesive spaces, which had the decision to agree on a better organization (Gómez, 1983: 365), so far unresolved; for Manabí it has not only been conflictive, but violent for the territorial domain due to the absence of state mediation, intervening in the republican period for conceiving it as an 'ungovernable' society and territory in 1835, replicated in 1963, up to the recent 2008. These "illegal" mechanisms have been legitimized in the resolution of political, economic and territorial conflicts, already part of the social imaginary, being reproduced even cinematographically and partisan of the current generations; relevant also in the liberal-altarist revolution with the participation of the montoneros montubios (Hidrovo, 2011: 33-62).

- 75 This provincial conformation resulted from the natural relationship/dependence of the colonial economic dominance of Guayaquil, reinforced at the same time with the construction and operation of the seaport in 1966 and the industrial installation since 1965 in Manta, which strengthened the relationship/dependence of Guayaquil's import port; contrasted with Portoviejo, the political capital that installed the centralist state dominance preventing margins of self-dominance, accentuated at present by the territorial deconcentration of the executive, which contributes little to the governing jurisdictional organization of Manabí.

Centralization that keeps spatially and politically isolated the rest of the provincial territory, only electoral quarry and provincial agri-food reserve and part of the country, induced with the agrarian reform of 1963 and 1974, sentencing to sustain its traditional agricultural roots, disconnected from industrialization, as well as from the international market; economically fragmented with micro spaces of industrial insertion, tourism and services; with a governance strengthened only by decentralization in relation to the national government, with no incidence in the economic-productive sphere; resulting in the same poor spatial geography, but with greater control and/or provincial political-economic domination induced by the national state in the use of the territory, which expanded the reproduction and accumulation of capital.

The centralization/fragmentation/dependence constitutionally implemented in 1830, was born unitary, divided by departments,

provinces, cantons and dependent parishes, with only administrative faculties (Art. 53); the Department had a Prefect representing the Executive Power. Each canton or the union of these would be governed by a corregidor; and the parishes by lieutenants; 4 years were fixed for these positions, with the exception of two years for the parishes; here the mechanism of reelection was already contemplated (Art. 54), as well as the creation of Municipal Councils exclusively in the capitals of the provinces (Art. 56).

Although the economic power does not exercise local government, it finances campaigns to favor or prop up elected officials; this internal domain keeps the localities tied to the national-provincial domain, which is why the GADs are not there to carry out the efficient exercise of local government, but rather to support and reproduce the political and capital domain.

- 76 The institutionality that governs the territory and population facilitated the legalization of lands for private use and appropriation, a fractioning condition that disfigured the dimension of territory, linking them to the exploitation of mercantilist-industrial agriculture; as opposed to the territory indissolubly linked to the roots and identity, surviving reduced Communes in the cantons of Puerto López and Jipijapa, resisting modernity from the autonomous-collective, different from the predominant political-administrative jurisdictions: Puerto Lopez and Jipijapa, resisting modernity from the autonomous-collective, different from the predominant political-administrative jurisdictions.

The so far unstable Ecuadorian constitutionalism has not constituted an effective internal political-jurisdictional regime, maintaining the perpetual centralist domination that already designated a mayor in 1835, extension of Municipal Councils beyond the provincial capital in 1845; the existence of Municipalities in all cantonal capitals since 1850; conformation of the municipal regime in 1852, with margins of independence in 1906, until achieving autonomy in 1946; with the latter, regulatory and budgetary generation was provided to exercise exclusive administrative powers until now in force.

The contemporary local-internal context in Ecuador

The contemporary transition from the oligarchic landowner State to the "modern bourgeois" urban-industrial with the developmentalism of the 50s of the twentieth century, highlights aspects related to the Municipal reconfiguration since 1967, level of government in charge of the Council, whose members are elected by direct and secret ballot

since 1945, for: Provincial Councilors, mayors and councilors, and since 1969 the Prefect is elected as the executive figure of the Provincial Council in office since 1970, culminating in 2010 that the common regime is configured to the levels of government of the State through the Organic Code of Decentralized Autonomous Territorial Ordering....

This normative and institutional culmination of internal Ecuador was influenced by the post Second World War, which should consolidate the national State with welfare for its population in central countries to be rebuilt, and in the periphery with the developmentalism of ECLAC since 1948, adopting the national and local planning approach in the backward and poor Ecuador, without having solved the structural problems, but should expand the state domination of the territory globalizing the national State that implemented a new geography of planetary domain.

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The above brought about the typology of "welfare state", utopically close to the one coined in 1945 by Europe after the Second World War, closely linking the state and the economy that offer a socioeconomic environment capable of guaranteeing the "welfare" of people; uniting politics with the economy achieving mutual benefits (Boaventura, 2012), "territorializing economic and political relations, leaving a state of social and territorial inequality", installing governmental instability.

This perspective of state management implied making local development transferred to Latin America with the return to democracy at the end of the 70s of the 20th century, which "counterposed" the globalizing process due to the insufficiency of macroeconomic development policies to solve problems associated with the creation of employment and the improvement of social welfare, aiming to give a greater presence to local and regional levels through development planning, a local development trend implemented in Europe in the 60s and 70s of the 20th century (Carrión, 2003: 24-29).

This local reinforcement of the central State was given with the sectional governments as a necessity of the developmentalism of CEPAL, approving the laws of the Municipal Regime in 1966 and Provincial in 1967 without having consolidated the national State, also substantially interrupted with the neoliberalism of the 80's of the XX century, weakened in social incidence, and more in the

territorial that have contributed to the political instability that Ecuador sustains.

The "autonomous sectional regime" was formed, necessary not to give Ecuador a territorial regime of government, but as a mechanism of national extension of internal domination that disputes participation in the budget of the deficient national treasury. This sectional led by the dominant municipalization inherited from the Cabildo, which continues demonstrating insufficiencies due to the sustained inequitable basic solutions, without having been democratized, lacking socio-territorial existence; of the current three levels of local governments, the subordinate are the parish councils, without the normative frameworks having achieved any governmental innovation, distributing competences without reaching or underpinning local development.

- 78 The sectional was not granted the capacity to alter the traditional and hegemonic state centralism, because the "autonomy" was born controlled, in that lies its weakness that have motivated autonomist claims from the periphery for greater budgetary participation, and outline a certain destiny with self-dominion that balances, integrates and cohesion to the national state adapting a necessary autonomous regime, so at the end of the 90s of the twentieth century, promoting autonomous electoral consultations favorably voted in Manabí (El Universo, 2000). XX the centrism State was losing hegemony, promoting autonomous electoral consultations favorably voted in Manabí on September 17, 2000 (El Universo, 2000), and in the same year: Guayas, El Oro, Los Ríos and Orellana, which did not produce effects that would reinforce autonomy and decentralization; to cushion these pretensions the participation of the central government budget to the sectional governments was increased through the Laws, of: Decentralization of the State and Social Participation, and that of Distribution of 15% of the Central Government Budget in 1997, truncating the autonomisms by the "loss of the monopoly of the national as an instance of cohesion and representation of the population" (Ramirez and Ramirez Gallegos, 2001: 113).

The "autonomist" bids, the only thing they outlined was the constitution of provincial, cantonal, even parochial electoral movements pretending to mark distances with the national domain, but without the support of solid political-territorial projects, although they returned to subordination with the recurrent national elections that underpin local electoral triumphs, also reconfiguring the

dominant traditional caciquism, demonstrating that the internal national State, although electorally destructured, continues responding to the national domain, as indicated by Panebianco (2009: 83), that, if the genesis of the political party occurred through a territorial penetration from a cohesive center to the peripheries, this propitiates the emergence of a stable dominant coalition, composed of both national and local leaders, whose power will derive from the control of the "zones of uncertainty".

Subsequent to the aforementioned claims, a certain territorial governance was installed via budgetary incentives, and with the decentralized executive diluting conjunctural resistances for attention to the peripheral jurisdictions, institutionalizing mechanisms of state financialization subsidized by the State Bank (BEDE), in addition to ministerial programs that basically interfere competentially and prevent the formation of jurisdictional autonomous capacities; with the above, two ways of maintaining governmental stability in the territory are installed, through budgetary subsidies, or by agreeing on local development, of the latter there is still no evidence.

Up to this point, what has been identified was a product of the internal jurisdictional invisibility due to the central conflict since 1979 with the struggle of powers (executive/legislative), which continued until 2000, when the party regime dissolved, moving towards the Executive vs. strong localisms installed in Guayaquil and Quito, supported by the powerful business and media elite until the present day.

This is in line with Boaventura's statement (2020: 73), that "in the last forty years, the market principle has received absolute priority to the detriment of the State and the community", that even with lethal viruses such as COVID 19, these 'pandemics cruelly show how neoliberal capitalism has incapacitated the State to respond to emergencies' (Ibidem: 74), leaving aside its essential reason for being, to implement socio-territorial welfare.

The dominant state reinstitutionalization.

The reforms as a state maxim in Ecuador have not achieved collective welfare, these reforms so far have not provided socio-territorial-institutional democratic capacities because "power is increasingly centralized in the State, while the citizenry becomes more autonomous" (Domingues, 2020: 275). What has been affirmed is tendential, without having been done by the electoral progressivism

of the XXI century that has returned the statist supremacy since Venezuela in 1999, up to the present, without the neoliberal anti-statists flinching, because the State continues to be necessary for national and territorial-population domination.

Because the institutional-normative statehood is not neutral, but responds to political-ideological visions in permanent dispute in Latin America, because the dominant bloc is not monolithic, it is expressed in factions that, while governing, reform the rules of the normative game that destabilize and hinder the configuration of the "welfare" State, factors that continue to favor the elite from power, despite the fact that Ecuador with its neo-constitutionalist revolution of 2008 recognizes through Art. 95 other forms of democracy: Direct and Communitarian, but subordinated to the representative government, the only one that emanates from the "sovereign" people and legitimizes the government of the State, very much in tune with the fact that "democracy is not the government of the people but of the politicians" (Nun, 2000: 21).

The consequent constitutions of 1978-1998-2008 have not shown improvement in the system or political regime, nor in the quality of representation, without granting effective social control of public power, only reinforced the political actors and the government, leaving no room for territories such as Manabí to conceive a provincial project with its cantons and parishes, where basic solutions are still pending, not even overcome by the rehearsed revocation of mandates of the successive mayors: Luis Mendoza of Junín, and Doris López of Jaramijó, and to José Rivera President of the Parish Council of San Lorenzo de Manta, all in 2011; which in no case were linked to the competence context and/or governing performance, but for political revenge that in nothing have contributed in the governmental exercise; ceasing to use this mechanism of control to local rulers, following untouched the practices of political-governing corruption; that to implant the state as political imaginary, only endowed with frameworks: institutional-normative will continue to be an unethical armor that acts surreptitiously, unveiling accusatory crosses without achievement in social and territorial justice.

The constitutional and organic accountability has not had a place, and could have become an honest exercise of transparency of the political-governing, plagued with platitudes, and personal condescension towards whoever governs in turn, transforming into

plausible advertising, a situation that causes public boredom, more for the absence of auditing and political control that revert in democratic improvement, rather it has been configured the citizen-governor separation; social immobility allows them to continue deciding and even harming local societies by increasing taxes for deficient services, squandering or committing public resources without contributing to lowering basic deficits, much less encouraging local economies.

The described costs are not ethically managed, underestimating electoral trust, negotiating support from Councilmen who easily join the majority of Mayors without having been elected in the same electoral grouping; support without support in a project, agenda or governance agreement of local benefit, undermining ethics, contributing to the distrust that socially declares that "all are the same or all are the same", delegitimizing local statehood.

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In this statehood, the democratic sense that goes beyond the electoral is still pending, especially when the local governmental action is not framed in the normative mandates nor minimally inserted in the political-territorial dynamics that process common agreements of the social demand, and adapting response capacities of the three levels of Ecuador's GADs that make feasible a governability according to Bobbio (1995: 12) "between the demand and the answers (Crisis of Democracy), the ungovernable is seen as the deficient, inept and incapable power. Therefore, the State is (or enters) in crisis when it does not have enough power to fulfill its duties"; reminded in each election period that makes visible the non-fulfillment of the sustained basic deficits.

State duties that do not comply with the exclusive competences, due to the fact that the actions of the GADs respond discretionally to who "governs", adjusting to what Castoriadis sentenced "that the political class can cling to cynicism and irresponsibility because it is not subject to any control nor to any sanction" (1994: 133-127), worse some resistance, since neither "the educational system is no longer capable of producing the individuals that make it work or in any case, of producing citizens". A very fashionable concept as a political slogan, rather than real citizen incidence.

In the transition to the "modern" developmentalist central bourgeois state since the 1970s, a new geography of power for internal domination was redefined. XX a new geography of power was

redefined for the internal domain, determining spatial categories and subcategories for the central and peripheral jurisdictions-territories, depending on the specific economic and political weight; in Manabí, Portoviejo and Manta were constituted as intermediate urban centers of provincial domain, and the others as local urban centers: Portoviejo and Manta were constituted as intermediate urban centers of provincial domain, and the others as local urban centers, anchored to a continental territory as a subspace destined to agro-export (Deller, 1978:100-102); adjusting to what is defined by Restrepo (2011: 352), that "geography is not a physical framework within which economic growth, employment or welfare takes place. Geography is the materialization of the expansion of political, economic and cultural relations among men. It is in space that power and marginality are organized, structured and distributed. Power always structures space. This new geography of power deepened the social and territorial division of labor, redistributing the social and jurisdictional division of poverty in Manabí.

The apparent provincial Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) as of 2010 (INEC) was 76.8% (63.89% urban and 95.9% rural), decreasing to 31.15% in 2021 (22% urban and 57% rural). Income poverty in 2021 affected 27.7% of the population, dropping only 7.3 points compared to 2008; the incidence of poverty in the same year was 5.1%, decreasing 2.9 points compared to 2008; the national Gini Index as of June 2021 is 0.493, urban is 0.478, and rural is 0.477; for Manabí it is 0.45 (INEC, 2018), determining inequality measured by income. The aforementioned decreases have occurred as a result of the temporary neo-developmental return of the central state between 2007-2017; demonstrating that without it, no reduction is possible, let alone any definitive solution.

The Latin American Center for Rural Development (2011: 2) also identifies the Latin American municipalities where two thirds of the population has not grown economically. In a little more than half, with two thirds of the population, the incidence of poverty has not decreased. In a little less than two thirds with 60% of the population, there has been no significant progress in income distribution. And in one third, with almost 40% of the population, there is no economic growth, poverty reduction, or improved income distribution, a situation that has not been overcome due to its structural nature.

With this evidence, it can be concluded in advance that the solution to basic problems does not depend on the degree of autonomy

developed in a given jurisdiction and level of government, as long as the centralist State continues to behave in an exclusive manner due to the supposed autonomies granted, and abstracts itself from key responsibilities, foisting ineffectiveness on local governance.

This single State is the one that should and must tend to polycentrism, concurring responsibilities between the central and local levels through the solidarity and subsidiarity proposed by Boisier (2004: 28), each social organization is competent to intervene in its own sphere (functional or territorial), transferring "upwards" only that which the common good or technology establishes as the responsibility of the greater entity; nothing certain in the periphery, which aspiring to raise the level of political jurisdiction would solve: poverty, inequalities and institutional/territorial democracy; achieving an unstructured fragmentation that accumulates parasitic bureaucracy that consumes the reduced allocated budget, without having improved
83 the equitable redistribution of resources from the national treasury, nor developed capacities in local governance.

Because this internal Ecuador is not governed by a political system, but by an apparent regime of government similar to the presidentialist one at the local government levels exercised by the Prefect, Mayor and President of the Parish Council, who have not installed the territorial regime of government, due to their low management capacities, based on the sole normative force, without being led by real actors with political projects; therefore, the territorial regime continues to be a challenge to anchor to the national State.

Encouraging and promoting that locals "reach certain previous levels of development and that, in addition, have a certain critical mass of strategic capabilities, they can have access to use the new opportunities for their benefit. In other words, globalization would be an opportunity especially for territories at medium levels of development and endowed with relevant strategic capabilities" (Bervejillo; 1996: 18-28); adopting a strategy of territorial competitiveness systemically intercepted, so: environmental, social, and political at equal levels that overcomes local backwardness, here autonomy should be a strategic resource to be decentralized from national political and economic domination, that modifies the territorial jurisdictions of the periphery into truly autonomous communities, allied with their civil societies that exercise a clear and

strong governance that responds to the territory-jurisdiction of Manabí.

The governance scenario in Manabí

To have democratic territorial governance, from the conventional way it has been institutionalized through the GADs and decentralized executive, also dependent on the changes of local governors every four years, and to the permanent mobility of the civil servants of the decentralized executive, aspect that does not contribute to a sustained provincial, cantonal and/or parochial development, nor with the continuity of reelected; the correctly sustained is the way by the civil society to the perspective of Arocena (1995: 31), which is "a system of action on a limited territory, capable of producing common values and locally managed goods"; being the most stable and territorialized, it really sustains a lasting proposal in Manabí.

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The one that not only generates demands, but also responsibilities that affect local governance by exercising co-responsibility, testing a new provincial social contract, where the citizen is the only one capable of expanding its space for participation as a civic exercise, which also promotes the return to the State as an organization of citizens with the objective of materializing effective decisions in matters of public good (Mora, 2009: 338).

With political, social and civic rights and duties, this civil society expresses itself at various levels and scenarios (local, national and even supranational); the local one, for the most part, bases its action only on the mechanisms institutionalized by current regulations, requiring a rethinking that alters the traditional functional-clientel State-civil society relationship.

The participation of this civil society must stop being only in the state, especially if it is fulfilled as a regulatory requirement, relapsing on citizens who respond to the local ruler of the day, avoiding institutional democratization and capacity building in local social organization. Beginning to debate from the moment a work or service that benefits and affects a certain population segment is decided, for example, with the empty chair (Law of Social Participation, Art. 77, 2010), which should be permanently promoted at all levels of GADs.

The existing institutionalized citizen participation is weak and dispersed, absent from public affairs, functional to the management circle of the GADs that justify expressions of: deliberation,

consultation; disjointed from accountability, less from the social control that observes rectifications and improvement in the essential basic and/or social goods.

Here in Manabí it is necessary to achieve a balance of functionality in the institutional aspect, expressing itself in equal conditions between the executive, be it the Prefect, the Mayor, the President of the Parish Council with the legislative-supervisory ones: Prefect, Mayor, President of Parish Council with the legislative-supervisors: Councilors, Councilmen and Parish Council Members; the latter are supposed to be genuine representatives of the local civil society; if the normative mandates were fully complied with, they should constitute counterweights to the dominant executives, which continues to postpone the institutional democratization contributing to the territorial democratization; aspiring the normative minimums of the COOTAD given in 2(f) with the objectives, 3(g) principles, and of the surface application of Chapter III (Arts. 302-312).

On the side of citizen participation, being the bearer of specific demands referred to the sector or specialty it represents, its leadership is not an interlocutor of integral demands that modify authoritarian and patrimonialist practices of local rulers, which do not contribute to diminish socio-spatial inequalities that induce the necessary socio-territorial equity.

This participation is not, nor should it be the result of the voluntarism of people or institutions, the result of chance or luck, especially when this participation is not measured or made in meetings, discussions, workshops, assemblies, however good or numerous they may be, it is made with democratic meanings; an intentional event that requires guiding approaches, the use of minimum procedures that demand the use of instruments and techniques, all of which are apprehensible, that is, knowledge and skills available to all people and that can be improved in practice. The constructions around power point to the need for orderly paths and systematic steps to exert influence, accessing local resources; that is to say, the collective construction of power calls for participatory methodology (Ramón, Galo. Torres, VH, 2004: 182).

The foregoing is regulated as Citizen Power under the Participation Law (Art. 29), the result of the process of individual and collective participation of the citizens of a community, who participate in a leading role in decision-making, planning and management of public

affairs, as well as in the social control of all levels of government, the functions and institutions of the State, and natural or legal persons of the private sector that manage public funds, provide services or develop activities of public interest (2010).

Although it is contradictory, since "today we are facing a world where, despite the fact that the obligation of governments to render accounts is regulated, they are less committed to process citizens' demands" (Mora, 2009: 338). The accountability that is obliged is still in the good intentions of democratization, disconnected from social demand, and much more from local programmatic agreements; therefore, the constitutional and normative purpose of citizenizing public power as an institutionalized mechanism with social control has been reversed, controlling the citizenry by the public power that renews political domination.

- 86 In Manabí it is worrying, due to the scarce, diminished, disarticulated and demobilized organizational expressions of the civil society that has not radically demanded to the local State, but to the national State, because the latter centralized the sectorial worker-peasant expressions preventing the constitution of a local social movement; although the neoliberal tendency to continue decentralizing the social demand, without social action; in order to exist it must have a diversified sense that overcomes the capital-labor dichotomy, including the socio-territorial demand.

Powerful citizen action must go hand in hand with installed governance, becoming decisive and active with autonomous exercise in the political-territorial sphere, dismantling the central dominance of state power, outlining the 'good governance', which refers to the role of institutions, their form of action, their legal representativeness, transparency, legitimacy, credibility and equity, in addition to the effectiveness and efficiency of their actions (Romero and Farinós, 2011: 56).

Where Governance, being "a complex set of actors and institutions, which do not belong only to the governmental sphere, and which is capable of translating the interdependence between power and institutions linked to collective action" (Lazarev, 2009: 198). In this notion of governance, institutions make up the local network in a web of actors that coordinate public and private initiatives with a common purpose, shared by the local community (Ibidem); a vision to be installed provincially in Manabí.

From this perspective, "governance must be a process of coordination of actors, social groups and institutions to achieve collectively defined goals in fragmented environments characterized by uncertainty" (Le Galés, 1998). Governance theory designates a specific form of public-private interaction based on non-hierarchical coordination to find new opportunities.

Requiring a type of institution, which encloses or concerns "a symbolic network, socially sanctioned, in which are combined, in variable proportion and relation, a functional component and an imaginary component. Alienation is the autonomization and predominance of the imaginary moment in the institution, which implies the autonomization and predominance of the institution in relation to society. This autonomization of the institution is expressed and embodied in the materiality of social life, but it always also assumes that society lives its relations with its institutions in the manner of the
87 imaginary, in other words, it does not recognize in the imaginary of the institutions its own product". (Castoriadis, 2008: 137).

Here the constant statehood must be made societal imaginary through institutionality, but rather it has been emptied of satisfiers, tending to arrive through governance that has institutionalized citizen participation, without the devices having satisfied the demand, nor lowered social conflict, because they have removed the essential to the imaginary, replaced with the character that governs, clashing the purpose, with reality.

This character focuses its priority on the scenarios of population concentration in the significant urban electoral area, to the detriment of the rural area where local-national state action is absent; correcting, it must conceive a horizontal intervention that balances the action of and between GADs, as well as that of the polycentric central government agencies in the territory.

This local governance should essentially contribute to the guarantee of rights, although with the minimum levels of development, the GADs should be provided with purposes and means to articulate territorial actions in coordination between GADs and stop being punctual, focused mainly on contributions from the provincial/municipal to the parish, being necessary to institutionalize this form of concurrent relationship, which does not depend on whoever serves as Prefect, Mayor or President of the Parish Council,

but that the state action is preferably focused on the population and the territory.

To present it as an innovation in the jurisdictional, the case of the Electoral Districts (urban and rural) that conform the current Municipal Councils, electing Councilmen of both scenarios, until now no changes are perceived in the management of the Municipal Government, because this continues to be conflictive in the Municipal Council between Mayor-Councilmen, without it being a product of the district origin of Councilmen, but of the dominant exercise of the strong executive vs. the weak legislative-fiscal; this type of relationship continues to hinder the action by the dispute in the control of the management. Even more so when it was supposed that the electoral districts should support a territorialized representation that differentiates and integrates the urban from and the rural, improving the quality of representation, an assumption that has not
88 been fulfilled, because personalization continues to prevail, which prevents the exercise of local governments from being properly embodied, ratifying that the Executive-legislative union should no longer be sustained as an institutional formula of local governance.

This innovation has neither modernized nor democratized Manabí, sustaining political primitivism among its actors, without giving room for the intervention of actors other than those established by the state, lacking moral, social, academic and cultural referents or observatories to influence or call attention to the decadent provincial state-political action.

Another failed aspect of the new constitutional innovation of 2008 is given by the hinge action of the mayors who must fulfill the functions of cantonal governor-legislator, and of Provincial Councilors; configuring the paradox that they resist to be supervised by their Municipal Council, a function that they must fulfill in the Provincial Chamber.

Therefore, the Provincial Council does not configure the condition of government level, being only the aggregation of the executives of the three levels of local government, which could be articulated for the effective intervention in the province and avoid fragmentation and dispersion; then, due to the absent and evident legislative generation and effective provincial supervision, they must become the genuine meeting of the provincially integrated multilevel government project.

Due to the absence of provincial legislature and supervision, the current territorial regime is weakened, requiring with force to conform the exclusive legislature that arises from the electoral suffrage through a Provincial Legislative Assembly, without being annexed and directed by the Prefect of the province, even changing the nomenclature so that, instead of Ordinances, there are provincial laws. This legislature must be the only one in the provincial territory, disappearing for this purpose the weak and even invisible Municipal Councils and the collective of Parish Councils; detaching the unproductive marriage even in the presentation of joint candidacies of Mayor and the subordinate list of councilmen, and the presentation of a single list for the Parish Councils.

Those elected to govern the GADs in Manabí in 2019 were: 1 Prefect, 1 Vice-prefect, 22 Mayors, 100 Urban Councilors, 38 Rural Councilors and 275 Principal Members of the Rural Parish Councils (CNE, 2019);
89 most of them were not chosen by militancy and outstanding cadres, a key requirement in political action, reduced to the candidate guaranteeing the election not by relevant personal characteristics, but by solvent personal financial backing.

This ascription dynamites the implementation of a democratic provincial governance, especially when the movements or political parties are linked to personal or group economic interests that take advantage of the discretionary management of the budgets of the GADs that monopolize the provincial capital, intervening with anticipated campaign financing, with the consequent recovery of the significant public contracting of: 1 Provincial Council, 22 Municipalities and 55 Parish Councils.

On the other hand, those elected once in office dissociate themselves from party loyalties, without holding on to the grouping or ideological line that nominated them, contributing to the excessive personalization of representation without consolidating the necessary political system or regime that democratizes the State in the territorial sphere, this fact dissolves the link between the elected and the grouping that promoted them, distancing them from the voters, and even more from the territory.

Therefore, "the party system is a cartel, so that elections have ceased to be a contest between opposing political options to become a simple selection of public managers" (Mair, 2013: 176); more so when the parties-movements that promote candidacies get rid of them without

assuming co-responsibility, which in a Constitutional State should be typified as a punishable act, since the party-movement is the vehicle that leads the elected to become imbricated in the State, depoliticizing governmental action.

In addition, all programmatic perspective is lost as a core link-contract between elected-electors, reduced only to be fulfilled in the registration of candidacies, without being binding on the action of the elected, becoming one of the many deviations of electoral democracy, being a failed cultural product, since the relationships between voters and political parties tend to be personal rather than programmatic or ideological (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Kitschelt et al. 2010: 1-4).

The dominant political tendencies in Manabí that have exercised and/or exercise governmental representation are predominantly right-wing, center-right and populist-progressive, as shown in the following table.

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Table 1. *Elections of Manabí 2004-2019*

PREFECTS ELECTED BY POLITICAL REPRESENTATION						
YEAR	NAME	Party / Movement	# of votes	% valid votes	Number of applications	
2019	Leonardo Orlando	Social Commitment	210.687	28,51		
2014	Mariano Zambrano	AP-Unit First	311.926	55,66		
2009		Municipalist- Unity First	276.584	46,26		
2004		PSC	242.208	49,26		
MAYORSHIPS ELECTED BY POLITICAL REPRESENTATION						
YEAR						
2019	PSC-UP (7)	Si Podemos (7)	AP (5)	ID (1)	Opportunity and Change (1)	Best City (1)
2014	AP-UP (8)	ADVANCES (6)	SUMA 5		PS-FA (3)	
2009	Municipalist and AP (11)	AP (6)	PSP (3)	Mantense Unit (1)	PSP (1)	MPD (1)
2004	PSC (9)	PRE (6)	PRIAN (4)		DP (3)	

Social Christian Party (PSC). Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE). Democracia Popular (DP). Patriotic Society Party (PSP). Alianza País (AP). Democratic Left (ID). Popular Democratic Movement (MPD). Unidad Primero (UP).

The table demonstrates the right-wing predominance of the Social Christian Party (PSC), through the figure of the Prefect who consolidated a political-electoral flow during 3 consecutive periods 2004-2019 (15 years), the longest in the provincial history, reaching to form his provincial political movement Unity First (UP), controlling electorally the prefecture, mayors and parish councils; transcending to the election of Provincial Assemblymen aligned to the dominant presidential binomial of the period in reference, only interrupted because the legal norm prevents indefinite reelection.

91 The result of the mayoral elections is evident in the predominance of the national political parties in the indicated period, altered only in the 2019 elections where there was incidence of the provincial and even cantonal movements, assuming a sort of test that stresses the sustainability and predominance of the national parties, to the detriment of the provincial ones.

The centralist electoral scenario as the only democratic path in Ecuador is delegitimized by the separation of the government-governed and rulers-governed link, it closes possibilities related to concrete action, since the institutions of democracy must be transparent scenarios open to public debate if they are to remain legitimate (Habermas, 1998b: 381-392).

Where electoral legitimacy at the three levels of local government has not been achieved with strong endorsements, justified with legal subterfuges through simple methods that quantify only valid votes, and not the electoral universe of the jurisdiction; This crucial aspect of representative democracy is not assumed by those elected, nor administered in the governmental period, being diluted by unethical practices, resulting in disenchantment, distrust, abstentionism and even punishment of the electoral vote; it also does not increase the citizenship of the governmental administration, referring to a mechanism similar to the second round of the presidential binomial if the legitimizing percentage is not obtained.

This reaffirms the non-existent provincial political regime, which is why it has been substituted with administrative approaches, guided by mechanisms inscribed in the instruments of strategic planning and territorial incidence decided from the institutional point of view,

without translating into real agreements that strengthen legitimacy with the actors of the province.

Even more so when the institutional framework is subject to the elected officials, and these are focused on carrying out works of supposed socio-population-territorial necessity for economic and electoral returns; a workerist approach removed from the competency mandates, with no impact on the overcoming of basic deficits, nor contributing to the construction of organized specialties due to the absence of territorially integral projects.

The period under review is part of the alleged uninterrupted democratic reinstitutionalization of Latin America since the end of the 70s of the twentieth century, where Ecuador was expanding and / or granting rights with the constituents of 1997 and 2008, without reaching the establishment of a stable democratic regime and welfare.

92 XX, where Ecuador was expanding and / or granting rights with the constituents of 1997 and 2008, without reaching to establish a stable democratic regime and welfare, nor has it meant an evolution in the intervening actors: political parties or movements, less in the ruling ruling class, without more than producing constitutional norms, structuring constituted powers, as ordering the constituent power as a subject, regulating democratic politics. (Negri, 2015: 27). Here the constituent power is not only omnipotent, but also expansive, its unlimited character is not only temporal, but also spatial (Ibidem: 29). With the constituent spatial expansion of the internal State, this has not outlined substantive changes in and for a territorial governance that configures the political system and regime, because it lacks the substantial population and spatial existence.

Mortati also reaffirms that the juridical constitution is erected on the social constitution, while the latter is formed by a set of groups and forces: "Every society from which a particular state formation arises and to which it is joined possesses its own intrinsic normativity, which is given precisely by its arrangement around forces or political ends". (2000: 145). With three levels of sectional government until 2008, each one was governed with its own regulations, opposing competencies that caused a disorganized social and territorial intervention, creating disputes for the clientelistic control of the electorate, adding the Parish Councils in 2000 as another level of local government; not having more levels of government in the same territory is directly favorable to a better territorial organization and local governance.

More when the provincial political geography is structurally dispersed, weak, fragmented, asymmetric, unfocused its action to solve the substantial problems for the population, divorced from its socio-territorial context, even with the pandemic of COVID 19 ratified the State-society divorce, taken advantage of more to print domain enacting rules, protocols, or policies without debate, consultation, decision, or knowledge of society, applying them coercively without processing democratically.

Without a project, with only the political and economic exploitation of the elite that owns or is related to the capital that it is not convenient to overcome: backwardness, poverty and develop democratically integrated scenarios, with evident social and jurisdictional inequalities, urban and rural of the province, is not only responsibility for the "capable" and incapable local rulers, but it is the capital that concentrates and deconcentrates the wealth, as well as
 93 distributes provincial poverty; making complex to translate the caciquist governing action, which prevents installing a democratic governance in Manabi, less stripping the current state dominance and let install a binarism between representative democracy and community self-government.

The formula of equality of and between levels of government has not been favorable for building adequate territorial governance, with evident asymmetries that cannot be overcome with constitutional or legal reforms or more elections, nor by increasing levels of government, especially when the elected actors will continue to be people who are not linked to the political sphere.

With the existing governments: provincial, municipal and parochial, if they were to leave the electoral dispute/control and focus on planning and organizing the territory regarding the provision and administration of basic goods, in: roads, mobility and urban-rural transit; water resources and environmental sanitation; support to human development; productive promotion and the articulation of international cooperation to the territory; strengthening and testing concurrences and commonwealths with the intervention of the deconcentrated national government, it will contribute to dissolve incompatibilities that prevent solving population problems, and territorial organization.

With the aforementioned, it is complex to effectively decentralize what is structurally centralized, let alone alter national domination.

For this reason, decentralization is not the most adequate strategy to have a creative and political impact on the territory, more with simple coordinations of the central State with and between levels of government that sustain minimum margins of governability.

On a par with the constitutional postulate that foresees building territorial equity among the different localities, reducing centralism, concretizing participative democracy, cohesion of the national State, improving the quality of life of the population with the failed incorporation of four substantial changes: the creation of a Regional Government; the creation of the National System of Competencies, of Special Regimes and decentralization, although this must be adjusted to the varied approaches of the National Territorial Strategies of the governments in office, such as the current ones focused on a supposed integrality and complementarity that territorialize public policy, whose guidelines: 1. Territorial support for the guarantee of rights by accessing
 94 services to reduce gaps, with sustainable land use, improving habitat and living conditions, comprehensive population care with priority to early childhood; 2. territorial management for the ecological transition with sustainable governance; and 3. articulation of the territory to take advantage of local potentialities, with deconcentration and decentralization and collaborative governance, (SENPLADES, 2022: 24-41), the current TNCs revolve around management that submits the territory to greater exploitation of its potentialities, with which it resolves its problems on its own without relying on central subsidiarity.

The aforementioned TNCs alter the normative mandate of the COOTAD, which assumes that planning is not only technical for all the GADs (Art. 241), but a central and articulating axis from the central-local-central, converted into local-central-local, where the center will tend to disengage while maintaining a certain governance, without local self-dominance, although it complies with the following: participatory, concurrent and relevant, with territorial planning, trying to be binding to the exclusive competences (Arts. 262, 263, 264 and 267, numerals 1). Establishing a new governance contract that preserves the principles of solidarity, subsidiarity, territorial equity and integration, exceeding governmental periods with lasting public policies.

The described state domain does not leave room for the territory to preserve the community as an agent of social change; here the territorial planning should be an opportunity to order the physical,

and local-provincial life, altering better living conditions, inscribed in tangible mandates with a strengthened institutionality and citizenship, that the strategic and territorial planning continues to remain in the technical-methodological formulation inapplicable, fulfilling the constitutional mandate (Arts. 262 to 267), and more the planning approach of the Central Government that fails to apply the substantial criterion of complementarity, in addition to the territorial concertation with and between the GADs and their civil societies.

Manaba-style governance

The model of state territorial management tested since 1979 requires an essentially democratized public institutional recovery and revitalization that improves state goods and services and facilitates integral territorial development. Equipped with a management model that is effectively deconcentrated and decentralized, participatory, with
95 continuous improvement, open and audited socially and politically under equal conditions, accountable, responsive to participatory planning, which is part of the constituent revolution cited by Negri.

To reconfigure the national territorial organization, through a strong deconcentration as a way to strengthen political decentralization, without parallelism that disputes the central-local territorial control, starting and finishing point of a substantial transformation process, containing the following decisions:

- Eliminate the overlapping of functions in state management between local and national levels of government;
- Budget for highly efficient deconcentration and decentralization that makes local development;
- To configure the intermediate level of government that articulates the center-periphery;
- Implement intelligently integrated territorial units;
- Achievement of socio-territorial justice;
- Exercise practices of governing counterweights in the GADs: Executive-Legislative, GADs-civil society.

This provincial Management Model should contain: principles, approaches, tools, moments, tangible and intangible achievements and actors that build them at each territorial level: provincial, cantonal and parish with effective participation, overcoming: "the problem of disarticulation, isolation, fragmentation; the capacities are there, the resources are there; the only thing missing is the vision

that it is possible, all together, cooperatively, to start new development processes, from below, from the local level (Coraggio, 2004: 66).

What has been developed should become the necessary support to configure, once and for all, from the socio-territorial relevance, the effective practice of a "new policy" of territorial management, which essentially privileges the access of all socio-territorial groups, even those excluded from the "political goods", starting with the key basic and public goods horizontally in and for Manabí that undertakes the postponed second stage of development in the third provincial centenary.

Conclusions

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The revised performance of the internal institutional State in Manabí, its jurisdictional condition of its almost 200 years as a province is still not enough to have managed to configure a community: political, spatial and population organized, but it has induced a common identity rooted belonging.

This process of provincial political configuration has become fragmented, a bottleneck that has not allowed overcoming backwardness in social and territorial justice, in addition to the capitalist use of the territory that expanded the domain of the liberal state that distributed inequalities in spite of the supposed autonomy, which has been conditioned and controlled, making local governance with multilevel participation complex, due to the fact that electoral control continues to be disputed, invalidating the configuration of a local governance with competitive utility.

This condition has not intervened to bring about changes in the sectional institutionalism, which has weakened the effective fulfillment of competencies that achieve local government efficiency; only focused on attending micro spatialities and sectors that have fragmented management, leaving this form and governmental level unaltered, sentencing to local immobility that has perpetuated the control of the local levels of government to the central domain.

In addition, it is shown that the instituted territorial regime has not contributed to the polycentric approach, and that as local government levels are conceived as equals, working mechanisms:

cooperative, concurrent and joint in the multilevel that strips the institutional, political and territorial colonization.

Therefore, the challenge of having a relevant territorial governance for the province of Manabí is still pending, being complex, having repercussions on the evident asymmetries: spatial, social, sectorial, etc., which still lacks the special organization of the territory by virtue of its own cohesion and integration at all jurisdictional levels, up to the communal level.

The constituted does not contribute to redirect the approach to implement a provincial governance in and with its three levels of local government, if it is proposed to do so, it is required to assemble an effective political unit as a socially organized entity in Manabí, possible if it stops prioritizing the political jurisdiction anchored to local governors, and anchors to cohesion with the internal population-nation 97 of the province.

Redefining the political-territorial organization of the province, with its cantonal and parish cells in equal and differentiated conditions; equal from a polycentric logic, which achieves territorial equity in socioeconomic terms, where those who have greater advantages, make the sacrifice of ceding opportunities to the less developed; differentiated, specializing the population and institutions based on the potentialities they have or count on.

Preserving the advantages of ancestral knowledge, levels of cohesion-integration, or degrees of development achieved in the modernizing process since the 70s of the twentieth century, adding the opportunities ceded and gained from national political-economic centralism.

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