
Received April 01, 2022 / Approved June 11 2023 Pages: 165-174
eISSN: 2600-5743
Centro Sur Vol. 7 No. 4 - October - December
This situation that arises as a result of the application of the
aforementioned provisions, produced bitter controversies with those
who proclaimed the impossibility of applying such articles, based -
among others - on the fact that the drafters of the Civil Code, if they
had wanted to extend them to persons under Public Law, would have
so stated without reservation. On the other hand, the differences
arising from the relationships of individuals are based on the principle
of free will, which in itself is opposed to the relationships emanating
from the public power, which need to be governed by rules of public
law.
It will mark a great advance in the jurisprudence of that time, the
recognition, no longer as a simple right, but with regulation of explicit
rules of the public sector, as a result of the famous Arret Blanco
decision of the French Court of Conflicts of February 8, 1873, through
which it was pronounced that state liability cannot be regulated by the
rules of the Civil Code, but, subject to its activities.
In North America, a different orientation will have the institution of
reparation (always manifested through one of its forms,
compensation), already strictly regulated in the Constitution, and it
will be the United States in 1787, which will establish the right to
compensation, when an expropriation has been carried out.
In South America, although through a special law (Law 24 of 1854),
Venezuela declared the absolution of slavery upon payment of
compensation to the owners of freed slaves. Argentina, with similar
scope, will regulate later (1860), but directly through its Magna Carta.
For its part, the twentieth century from its beginnings, outlines the
concern for regulating reparation in the constitutional sphere; it does
so by covering diverse aspects that reached other horizons in the
protection of the components of the legal sphere of the human being.
Thus, the Chilean Constitution of 1925, demonstrating a great advance
for the time, would point out:
"Any individual in favor of whom a judgment of acquittal is rendered
or who is definitively acquitted shall be entitled to compensation, in
the manner determined by law, for the actual or merely moral damages
they have unjustly suffered".
It should be pointed out -with respect to the above quotation- that said
legislation referred at that time to two types of compensation: that is,
physical damages, on the one hand, and moral damages, on the other.